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This paper examines the peculiar position of political staffers in representative democracies. Unlike 
many other political actors, staffers are directly involved in politics without having received a 
democratic mandate through elections. By applying the influential framework of delegation and 
accountability to this unique population, the paper takes an innovative look at the relationship 
between staffers and elected elites. Based on original survey data collected among Belgian and 
Dutch staffers, the paper analyses staffers’ autonomy and influence and examines how they are 
controlled by party leaders, MP’s and ministers through practices of recruitment and monitoring. 
While the results indicate that staffers have considerable autonomy and influence, they also show 
that elected elites have ample opportunities to control staffers – especially MP’s and Ministers. 
Moreover, elected elites are closely involved in monitoring staffers with high degrees of political 
influence. Although these results demonstrate that the existence staffers does not entail a systemic 
democratic deficit, more in-depth research is needed to discover when control mechanisms like 
recruitment and monitoring are (in)effective tools to keep staffers accountable.  
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Political staffers participate in daily politics without having obtained a democratic mandate through 
elections. In contrast to politicians, they cannot be held accountable by voters and the general 
public remains largely unaware of their role outside the political spotlight. As a result, staffers seem 
to slip through the cracks of the democratic process. A growing number of scholars are raising 
pertinent questions concerning the democratic legitimacy of this unelected elite (Eichbaum & 
Shaw, 2007; Barbara S Romzek, 2000; S. Svallfors, 2017a). This paper aims to join this challenging 
debate by applying the theoretical framework of delegation and accountability to political staffers 
(Strom, 2003). By analysing how political decision-making power can be transferred legitimately 
along a democratic chain of delegation, this influential framework examines the interactions 
between political actors such as voters, representatives and governments. How exactly do political 
staffers fit into the democratic chain of delegation? In doing so, the paper aims to address a 
fundamental tension between professionalization and representative democracy: does the growing 
presence of staffers create an accountability deficit?  
I argue that staffers’ lack of a direct democratic mandate is not problematic in and of itself. Even 
if they have political influence, their pivotal role is not undemocratic as long as they “are accountable 
to someone who is accountable to the electorate, the party organisation, or both” (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017). 
However, this means that the accountability relationship between staffers and elected elites has 
important implications. For this reason, this paper focuses on the relationship between staffers and 
three types of elected elites: party leaders, MP’s and government ministers. Based on survey data 
collected among Belgian and Dutch political staffers (N=1008), I analyse the structural 
accountability mechanisms that keep staffers responsive towards these political principals. 
Although several control mechanisms can be used to keep staffers in line, this paper explicitly 
focuses on so-called ‘police patrol oversight’, in which principals (elected elites) directly control 
their agents (staffers) (McCubbins & Schwartz, 1984). Are the elected political masters themselves 
involved in controlling the puppets who make up their staff? 
The paper offers an empirical examination of the mundane, everyday political practices that ensure 
this structural accountability. The analysis is driven by three research questions. The first research 
question addresses staffers’ ability to affect political decision-making: How autonomous and influential 
are political staffers (RQ1)? The second research question examines how frequently elected elites make 
use of the control mechanisms at their direct disposal: How strong is the involvement of elected elites in the 
recruitment and monitoring of staffers (RQ2)? The third research question investigates the link between 
autonomy, influence and control to examine whether elected elites actually control the staffers who 
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matter the most. Are elected elites more involved in controlling highly autonomous and influential staffers (RQ3)? 
The results show that there is no structural accountability deficit among Belgian and Dutch staffers. 
Despite relatively high levels of autonomy and influence, elected elites have ample opportunities 
to oversee and steer the work of staffers. Importantly, elected elites are more closely involved in 
the monitoring of influential staffers.   
This paper proceeds as follows. In the theory section, the influential framework of delegation and 
accountability is applied to political staff. After situating staffers within the democratic chain of 
delegation, I develop three hypotheses concerning the relationship between staffers and elected 
elites. The data and methods section addresses case selection, data collection and discusses how 
theoretical concepts such as autonomy, influence and control were operationalized empirically. The 
results section includes descriptive analyses of both staffers’ autonomy and influence as well as the 
involvement of elected elites in the recruitment and monitoring of staffers. Furthermore, regression 
models were estimated to examine whether elected elites are more involved in the control of highly 
autonomous and influential staffers. Finally, the conclusion addresses the main findings and reflects 
on their implications.    
Staffers’ democratic accountability 
This paper aims to explore the democratic accountability of political staffers: those who get paid 
to work behind-the-scenes within a party’s central office, parliamentary party group or ministerial 
office. In contrast to elected elites, staffers are appointed by party organizations or elected officials 
and are not elected. Research indicates that these unelected individuals have considerable influence 
on policy positions (Laube, Schank, & Scheffer, 2020; Montgomery & Nyhan, 2017), legislative 
activities (Busby & Belkacem, 2013), political communication (Sabag Ben-Porat & Lehman-Wilzig, 
2020) and coordination between coalition partners in government (Askim, Karlsen, & Kolltveit, 
2018; Maley, 2011). As a result, some have questioned the democratic legitimacy of this unelected 
yet pivotal elite (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2007; Barbara S Romzek, 2000; S. Svallfors, 2017a). However, 
the absence of a direct electoral mandate does not make political actors illegitimate. In 
parliamentary democracies for example, members of the executive branch do not receive a direct 
mandate from voters. Instead their position is legitimized through a process of delegation and 
accountability, emanating from directly elected representatives in parliament. To study this 
relationship, legislative scholars have developed a conceptual framework focusing on the 
interaction between principals and agents. Although the accountability question is a recurring 
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theme in research on staff, this well-developed conceptual framework has only rarely been applied 
to this specific population (see: Barbara S Romzek, 2000 for a notable exception).  
The framework of delegation and delegation examines the interactions between principals and their 
agents (Strøm, 2000). As the agents in this story, staffers are delegated a number of tasks by a 
principal. While the relationship between parties and political staffers can also be studied through 
this perspective (Moens, 2020), this paper focuses on the link between staffers and three types of 
elected elites: party leaders, MP’s and government ministers. Political staffers are hired by these 
elites to support them in their daily activities, such as holding an elected office or running a party. 
In doing so, these principals entrust staffers with certain aspects of their own electoral mandate 
because they lack the time and resources to manage all their activities individually. As these elected 
elites attained their position through an electoral mandate, figure 1 illustrates how political staffers 
are actually situated at the receiving end of a larger chain of delegation (Strom, 2003).  
Figure 1: Staffers’ position within the democratic chain of delegation 







The position of parliamentary staffers within the democratic chain of delegation is the most 
straightforward. The process of delegation starts at the voting booth: by voting for a particular 
candidate and party, voters elect MP’s to represent their interests and preferences. Consequently, 
parts of their democratic mandate is delegated to parliamentary staffers, who assist MP’s in 
representing their voters. The activities of these staffers include constituency service (Landgrave & 
Weller, 2020), legislative work (Busby & Belkacem, 2013) and managing the external 
communication of representatives (Sabag Ben-Porat & Lehman-Wilzig, 2020). Although it involves 
an extra step with the process of delegation, the position of ministerial staffers is relatively similar. 
In parliamentary democracies, MP’s partially transfer the democratic mandate they receive from 
voters to the executive branch. The government ministers are made responsible for implementing 
democratic decisions through votes of confidence. On their turn, these government ministers are 
supported by staffers who coordinate with coalition partners, civil servants and policy advice on a 
minister’s competences (Maley, 2011; Shaw & Eichbaum, 2018). 
As the democratic mandate of party leaders is less straightforward, the chain of delegation follows 
a different path for the staffers who support them. Firstly, party leadership selections are more 
idiosyncratic as procedures vary between parties and political systems (Lisi, Freire, & Barberà, 
2015). The possibilities range from inclusive selection methods such as open primaries or election 
by members votes to exclusive selection methods such as coronations by elites within party 
councils (Cross & Pilet, 2015). Despite this diversity however, the mandate of party leaders often 
emanates from members as many parties have democratized leadership selection procedures during 
recent decades (Cross & Blais, 2012). In large majority of cases, party members are either 
represented by delegates who select the party leader at a convention or party members can directly 
vote for their preferred leadership candidate (Cross & Pilet, 2015). As shown in appendix A, all 
parties included in this study fall into one of these two common leadership selection methods. 
Secondly, party leaders are not just accountable to the rank-and-file of their parties but also respond 
to the preferences of voters. As leaders are principally responsible for the party as a whole, their 
internal support base often hinges on electoral results. However, the decision to stay on or step 
down ultimately remains an internal party affair. As the formal mandate of party leaders originates 
among party members within all parties included within this study, I consider party members as 
the cornerstone for this chain of delegation. Since party leaders cannot run a party on their own, 
they are supported by staffers who deliver tailored policy advice (Pittoors, Pattyn, & Van Hecke, 
2017), manage the leaders’ media presence and run the party machine.  
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This paper zooms in on the last step within these chains of delegation and accountability: the 
relationship between staffers and elected elites. This link is important because staffers’ involvement 
in politics is not fundamentally problematic if they “are accountable to someone who is accountable to the 
electorate, the party organisation, or both” (Karlsen & Saglie, 2017). From the perspective of staffers, I 
examine their professional autonomy and political influence (RQ1). These are essential indicators 
to evaluate the potential risks and costs of agency loss. From the perspective of elected elites, I 
analyse how frequently elected elites control staffers by analysing the recruitment and monitoring 
of political staff (RQ2). Finally, I investigate whether more autonomous and influential staffers are 
controlled more intensely by elected elites (RQ3).  
The first research question addresses staffers’ autonomy and influence. In the context of the work 
place, autonomy refers to an area of discretion in which employees are allowed to make their own 
judgements and decisions (Wallander & Molander, 2014). For example, staffers’ autonomy is high 
when they can determine their professional goals by themselves and decide on how those can be 
achieved. In contrast, staffers’ autonomy can be considered low when such matters are in the hands 
of elected elites or managers and staffers themselves have little individual leeway. Staffers’ influence 
refers to their impact on politics. Although staffers might not exercise power in direct or formal 
way, they can indirectly affect politics by shaping the activities, communication or policies of parties 
and politicians. This paper examines their influence on four dimensions: the party in general, the 
party leader, MP’s and ministers. I consider both autonomy and influence as essential, necessary 
conditions for agency loss. Staffer can only diverge from the interests and preferences of elected 
elites in a substantial way if they have a) the autonomy to pursue their own goals and b) the 
influence to have an individual impact on politics.  
Staffers are generally considered to have substantial autonomy and influence. For example, Romzek 
(2000) argues that the position of congressional staffers in the US includes a high degree of 
autonomy because the relationship between staffers and elected elites is not strictly hierarchical. 
Their interactions cannot be reduced to a relationship between supervisors and subordinates – it  
also includes a division of labour in which both have their own roles to perform. As elected elites 
primarily focus on their own role, they lack the time and energy to micro-manage staffers’ activities. 
Rather than giving detailed directives, elected elites set the general goals that staffers are expected 
to pursue. Instead of merely following orders, staffers are expected to assess the situation, anticipate 
the preferences of elected elites and act accordingly. As this relationship is based on a high degree 
of trust (Gouglas, 2018), the concrete translation of these goals lies within staffers’ accepted sphere 
of influence. “Once a direction or task has been decided upon, staff are often given substantial latitude in deciding 
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how to accomplish the goal” (Barbara S. Romzek & Utter, 1997, p. 1259). This puts a lot of faith in 
staffers because their role often requires them to rely on their own judgement. Moreover, they are 
often are encouraged to take on a pro-active, entrepreneurial role by taking initiative (Webb & 
Fisher, 2003). In effect, they are granted “the discretion (or choice) to anticipate and respond to someone else's 
agenda or expectations” (Barbara S Romzek, 2000, p. 418). I anticipate that this pivotal role leads 
staffers to perceive themselves to be both relatively autonomous and influential. 
H1: Staffers generally consider themselves autonomous and influential.  
The democratic chain of delegation implies that staffers’ autonomy comes at the price of 
accountability. However, staffers’ accountability is often problematized (Abbott & Cohen, 2014; 
Tiernan, 2007). For example, Svallfors (2020) cites the influential work of Dahl (2008), who warned 
that policy specialists might escape effective democratic control because they are not fully 
accountable for their actions. On occasion, this image is confirmed by scandals where 
responsibilities of staffers and elected elites are publicly debated. However, Romzek (2000) points 
out that accountability mechanisms extend way beyond such high-profile cases. “Although outside 
observers only notice accountability when there is an administrative breakdown of some sort, effective accountability 
is an everyday occurrence, not something that is invoked only in the breach” (Barbara S Romzek, 2000, p. 427). 
Rather than studying such individual breaches or anomalies, this paper examines the structural use 
of control mechanisms by elected elites.  
The second research question addresses how frequently staffers are controlled by elected elites 
(RQ2). The principal aim of such control mechanisms is to prevent agency loss by keeping agents 
in line with the preferences and interests of their principals (Strom, 2003). By focusing on the direct 
involvement of elected elites in controlling staffers, the paper explicitly addresses ‘police-patrol 
oversight’, in which principals do much of the oversight themselves (Lupia, 2003; McCubbins & 
Schwartz, 1984). As a consequence, the analysis does not consider ‘fire-alarm oversight’, in which 
elected elites rely on others (managers, staffers’ peers, media, …) to raise the alarm in case of agency 
loss. Principals can use ‘ex-ante’ control mechanisms (before the agent acts) as well as ‘ex-post’ 
control mechanisms (after the agent acts) (Lupia, 2003). To cover both types of control, the analysis 
examines the involvement of elected elites in staffers’ recruitment (ex-ante) as well as the 
monitoring of staffers (ex-post). However, elected elites can be expected to devote little time and 
energy to controlling staffers because they are focused on their own political mandate. Indeed, 
Romzek & Utter (1997) conclude that “Members of Congress, as staff supervisors, are the primary internal 
mechanism for legislative staff accountability. But the nature of the staff relationship is such that members have 
limited time, inclination, and ability to discern when staff have deployed their expertise in ways that undermine 
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institutional purposes” (Barbara S. Romzek & Utter, 1997, p. 1254). Therefore, I anticipate that elected 
elites only rarely control staffers by themselves. 
H2: The structural involvement of elected elites in controlling staffers is low. 
The third research questions examines whether more autonomous and influential staffers are 
controlled more intensely by elected elites (RQ3). Despite the expectation that the general 
involvement of elected elites in controlling staffers will be low, I anticipate that their involvement 
will vary considerably between different types of staffers. As elected elites cannot control all staffers 
permanently, I argue that staff oversight by elected elites is based on strategic considerations. 
Elected elites will focus their limited time and energy on controlling those staffers where potential 
agency loss is the most consequential. More specifically, agency loss among staffers with high levels 
of autonomy and political influence can cause the most damage. The underlying reason for this lies 
at the heart of the democratic chain of delegation and accountability. Highly autonomous and 
influential staffers have been entrusted with important aspects of the democratic mandate received 
elected elites. Almost by definition, these types of staffers “work in close consultation with [elected elites] 
and take direction from their members regarding goals. Depending upon a level of experience and trust, there is the 
potential for reciprocal relationships, where some staff can influence their member's goals” (Barbara S. Romzek & 
Utter, 1997, p. 1259). I anticipate that such close working relationships cause elected elites to 
participate personally in the recruitment and monitoring of staffers in such positions. 
H3: Highly autonomous and influential staffers are controlled more strongly by 
elected elites. 
Data and method 
This study examines staffers from Belgium and the Netherlands. Both nations are historically 
divided societies which have overcome societal cleavages through consociationalism and power-
sharing (Andeweg & Irwin, 2009; Deschouwer, 2009). Their highly proportional electoral systems 
have produced extensive, complex party systems that require cooperation through coalition 
government (Lijphart, 1978, 1981). In both countries, this institutional context has created 
collective staff infrastructures centred around parties, who predominantly recruit staffers within 
their own network (Moens, 2020). By combining these two cases, the empirical analysis can exploit 
the many variations between more than a thousand staffers from fourteen political parties. 
Moreover, it enhances the robustness of the findings as they extend beyond the peculiarities of one 
specific case.  
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Despite their many similarities however, two relevant points of difference between Belgium and 
the Netherlands have an impact on the analysis. Firstly, the institutional position of party leaders 
is different. Whereas Belgian party leaders reside within the dominant extra-parliamentary party 
organizations (De Winter & Dumont, 2006), the position of Dutch party leaders usually coincides 
with the position of party group leader in parliament (Andeweg, 2000). Secondly, staff support for 
ministers differs as ministerial offices play a far more central role in Belgian politics (Brans, 
Pelgrims, & Hoet, 2006). As a member of the European continental administrative tradition 
(Painter & Peters, 2010), impartial civil servants provide the most important policy advice to Dutch 
ministers as they are only assisted by a handful of political staffers. As a member of the Napoleonic 
tradition, an extensive team of partisan ‘cabinet advisors’ provide the most important policy advice 
to Belgian ministers and distrust fuels the marginalization of a politicized civil service (De Winter 
& Brans, 2003).  
Data collection 
Original survey data were collected among the paid staff of fourteen parties (Appendix A). Since 
the support of party leadership was indispensable for contacting the target population, face-to-face 
interviews with senior party management were set up to gain an official endorsement. Although 
parties are often reluctant to provide access to their personnel (Webb & Keith, 2017; Webb & 
Kolodny, 2006), this approach resulted in the participation of 14 out of 25 parties represented in 
the Belgian and Dutch parliaments. Apart from the radical right family (which refused to 
participate), these cases mirror the diversity of the party landscape in electoral size, organizational 
resources and ideological outlook. Before launching the online survey, a carefully-developed 
questionnaire was tested among party staffers during 33 face-to-face interviews.  
Designed to be completed in under 15 minutes, the questionnaire contained general background 
questions on staffers' sociodemographic characteristics, day-to-day professional activities and 
previous professional experiences, but also gauged their political attitudes, future ambitions and 
their interactions with peers and elected elites. Between December 2018 and January 2020, the 
complete population of staffers from the participating parties received a digital invitation to answer 
this online questionnaire, followed up by two reminders. Out of a population of 2936 individuals, 
the survey obtained a response rate of 34% (N=1009). To calculate response rates and check the 
representativeness of our findings, participating parties provided population data. Based on the 
weighted cases approach (Parke, 2012), X2-tests were run to test under – or overrepresentation 
among specific subgroups within the sample. Post-stratification weights were calculated based on 
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population data on the number of staffers within each party, party face and age category (weighting 
factors range from 0,63 to 1,37).  
Variables and analysis 
The analysis considers two independent variables to measure potential agency loss: staffers’ 
professional autonomy and staffers’ political influence. Professional autonomy was operationalized 
as 11-point scale ranging from 0 (low autonomy) to 10 (high autonomy). Political influence was 
measured on 4 scales, each covering a different dimension of influence: the party in general, the 
party leader, MP’s and government ministers. The operationalization is identical for all dimension 
as these variables were measured through 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 (no influence) to 7 
(very high influence). The analysis examines both ex-ante control and ex-post control by elected 
elites as the dependent variables. Ex-ante control was operationalized as the involvement of three 
types of elected elites in staffers’ recruitment: party leaders, MP’s and government ministers. This 
operationalization results in three dummy-coded variables indicating whether or not a specific 
elected official was involved in the recruitment and selection of a staffer (0=not involved,  
1=involved). Ex-post control was operationalized as the frequency of contact between staffers and 
the same elected officials: party leaders, MP’s and government ministers. The operationalization is 
identical for all variables: a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (daily).  
Admittedly, contact does not guarantee effective control by elected elites as conversations with 
staffers can cover many other subjects. However, I consider frequent contact as a necessary 
condition for effective monitoring by elected elites. Moreover, a similar argument can be made for 
the direct involvement of elected elites in staff recruitment. As such, these two variables show to 
what extent elected elites have the opportunity to control the actions of staffers. Whether they use 
these opportunities to exert effective control is beyond the scope of this paper. Lastly, the party 
face in which staffers are professionally active was added as a control variable because staffers’ 
influence and their relation to specific elites is strongly connected to their position. Based on the 
location where staffers spend most of their time during their professional activities, they were 







Table 1: Variables  
Variables N Min Max Mean SD 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
     
  Professional autonomy 992 0 10 7,9 1,38 
  Political influence      
   Party in general 994 1 7 3,30 1,54 
   Party leader 994 1 7 2,48 1,44 
   Party in Parliament 992 1 7 3,13 1,68 
   Minister  986  1  7  3,33  2,02  
DEPENDENT VARIABLES      
  Recruitment      
   Party leader 998 0 1 0,03 0,16 
   MP’s 550 0 1 0,32 0,47 
   Minister 554 0 1 0,26 0,44 
  Contacts      
   Party leader 916 1 5 2,23 1,19 
   MP’s 914 1 5 3,45 1,26 
   Minister  918  1  5  3,6  1,53  
CONTROLS      
  Party face      
   Central office 1008 0 1 0,21 0,41 
   Parliament 1008 0 1 0,30 0,46 
   Ministerial Office 1008 0 1 0,49 0,50 
      
 
To answer the first research question, the paper examines the distributions of staffers’ self-
perceived autonomy and influence descriptively. While the analysis of staffers’ professional 
autonomy examines the whole population of staffers, the analysis of staffers’ political influence 
offers a more fine-grained picture. Although it considers the whole population to show staffers’ 
influence on the party in general, the analysis of staffers’ influence on elected elites only includes 
the staffers who work within the same party face as the concerned elected official (party leader, 
MP’s or ministers). The distribution of staffers who work in different party faces than the 
concerned elected official are included in appendix B. The paper then describes the prevalence of 
two control mechanisms to address the second research question. After showing the involvement 
of elected elites in staffers’ recruitment in general and within their own party face, the paper 
discusses the frequency of contacts between elected elites and the staffers who work within the 
same party face. Lastly, I examine the relation between potential agency loss (autonomy and 
influence) and control by elected elites (recruitment, monitoring) through an explanatory analysis. 
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The link between potential agency loss and recruitment is analysed through 3 binomial regression 
models, one for each type of elected official (party leader, MP or minister). Similarly, the relation 
between potential agency loss and monitoring is examined through 3 OLS regressions explaining 
the frequency of contacts between staffers and three types of elected elites (party leader, MP or 
minister).  
Results 
Staffers’ self-perceived professional autonomy is remarkably high. The average score on the 11-
point scale between 0 and 10 is 7,9. As illustrated by Figure 2, this high degree of professional 
autonomy is nearly universal among staffers: the overwhelming majority (95%) is concentrated on 
the right side of the scale. Only a tiny minority of staffers (3%) reportedly experience a low degree 
of professional autonomy by indicating a value below 5. Despite some small differences, this 
specific pattern can be observed among staffers from central offices, parliaments and ministerial 
offices alike. While central office staffers consider themselves a tiny bit less autonomous (p<0.1) 
and ministerial staffers are slightly more autonomous (p<0.1), the large concentration of staffers 
on the highly autonomous side is clearly visible among staffers from all party faces. Specific 
distribution plots for each party face and the details of the T-tests can be found in appendix B.   
Figure 2: Staffers’ professional autonomy (N=992) 
 
Based on this high degree of autonomy, one might be tempted to conclude that the potential for 
agency loss among staffers is quite high. However, I argue that professional autonomy can lead to 
agency loss if staffers have actual influence on political matters. For this reason, these findings on 
13 
 
staffers’ professional autonomy should be analysed in close tandem with staffers’ political 
influence. Staffers’ self-perceived political influence shows how staffers’ impact on politics is more 
complex than suggested by measuring autonomy. When it comes to actual influence on political 
matters, a more limited group of staffers actually consider themselves influential (Figure 3). The 
analysis takes an in-depth look at staffers’ influence by considering four specific dimensions of 
influence: parties in general, party leaders, MP’s and ministers. As the distribution of staffers is 
remarkably different across these four dimensions, they are clearly more politically involved in 
parliaments and ministerial offices.  
Staffers rarely consider themselves influential on a general level. On this first dimension, staffers 
from all party faces (central office, parliament and ministerial office) are included in the distribution. 
The results show that most consider their general influence low to average. Only one in five 
indicates that their influence is higher than average. Secondly, those work within the same party 
face as the party leader (Belgian central offices, Dutch parliament) also seem to have little 
substantial influence of their leaders’ activities and positions. Again, most consider their influence 
on this dimension low to average and only around 20% of staffers situate their influence above 
average. In short, few staffers have a substantial impact on the general course of their party or their 
party leader. This is not particularly surprising, as single staffers are merely individuals within the 
collective machinery that supports the party and its leader. In contrast, the political influence of 
staffers in parliaments and ministerial offices is both higher and more focused. Although the reach 
of party leaders trumps the activities of individual representatives, MP’s are clearly more susceptible 
to staffers’ influence. Almost half of all parliamentary staffers (43%) indicate that their influence 
on the activities of MP’s is above average. This effect is even stronger among those who work in 
ministerial offices, as the majority of ministerial staffers (56%) consider themselves influential.  
These findings partially confirm the first hypothesis, which stated that staffers generally consider 
themselves autonomous and influential. The evidence on their autonomy are unequivocal: the large 
majority of staffers consider themselves highly autonomous. When it comes to influence, the 
results are more nuanced. While few staffers appear to have an impact on their party leader or the 
general course of the party, they consider themselves relatively influential on more specified 
dimensions – such as the activities and positions of MP’s and government ministers.  
 




               Influence on party in general (N=994)                                                Influence on party leader (N=242)          
     




To examine the use of control mechanisms by elected elites, I analyse their involvement in the 
recruitment and monitoring of staffers. I first consider how often elites participate in the selection 
of new staff. The involvement of elected elites in staffers’ recruitment is a form of ex-ante control, 
as they can directly affect the composition of their staff by participating in the selection of 
candidates. Figure 4 illustrates that the involvement of MP’s and ministers in staff recruitment is 
substantially higher than the involvement of party leaders. As MP’s actively participate in the 
selection of more than 80% of all parliamentary staffers, they are the most active recruiters among 
elected elites. Although the involvement of government ministers is somewhat lower, they are 
nonetheless directly involved in the selection of just over 50% of all ministerial staffers. These rates 
stand in stark contrast to party leaders, who participate in very few recruitments.  
 
Figure 4: Participation of elected elites in staff recruitment (N=998) 
  
 
In contrast to recruitment, monitoring is a permanent control mechanism. Direct contacts with 
staffers enable elected elites to a) preventively signal their preferences to staffers and b) receive 
information on staffers’ recent activities. Again, the analysis demonstrates a sharp contrast between 
party leaders, MP’s and ministers. Among staffers who work within the same party face as party 
leaders, only a minority of 38% indicate that they meet the party leader at least once a week. Despite 
working at the official seat of power, direct contact with party leaders remains quite a rare event 
for most staffers. This stands in stark contrast with other elected elites such as MP’s and ministers.  
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Figure 5: Monitoring by elected elites 
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Contacts with MP’s (N=284)
 
              
Contacts with Ministers (N=437)         
                    




Among parliamentary staffers, an overwhelming majority of 92% interacts with MP’s at least once 
a week. For most of them, contacts with MP’s are part of their daily routine. Although there is a 
little more distance between ministers and their staff, a similar pattern can be observed among 
ministerial staffers, of whom 83% meets their minister at least once a week. Moreover, about half 
of all ministerial staffers interact with their minister on a daily basis.  
It is likely that the differences between MP’s, ministers and party leaders reflect their respective 
political roles and the support structures that come with it. As party leaders are responsible for the 
party as a collective organization, they lack the time to actively control all staff many staffers – even 
within their own party face. Rather than micro-managing their staff, these responsibilities are 
delegated to staffers in management positions. In contrast, MP’s are supported by more limited 
staffs. As a result, controlling them is less time-consuming. Moreover, these smaller staffs include 
few managers who might take over the control of staffers. Ministers fall somewhere in between 
both situations. On the one hand, ministerial staffers do not support a collective organization: they 
are directly accountable to individual ministers. On the other hand, the extensive Belgian ministerial 
offices do include several managers to whom the control of staffers can be delegated. These 
findings do not support the second hypothesis, which anticipated that the involvement of elected 
elites in the control of staffers is generally low. Although this certainly appears to be the case for 
party leaders, MP’s and government ministers elites frequently make use of control mechanisms 
such as recruitment and monitoring.  
Lastly, I examine whether control by elected elites is higher for those staffers among whom agency 
loss would be the most costly. To evaluate the use of ex-ante control, three binary logistic 
regressions were estimated to show when party leaders, MP’s or ministers get involved in staff 
recruitment. Table 2 shows that the involvement of elected elites in staffers’ recruitment is linked 
to staffers’ political influence but not to their professional autonomy. The first model demonstrates 
that party leaders are more likely to be involved in the recruitment staffers who influence them 
later on. Although this direct link between influence on – and recruitment by specific elected elites 
might seem evident, this is not the case for MP’s and Ministers. Although they are significantly 
more involved in the recruitment of staffers within their own party faces, they do not necessarily 
select those staffers who influence them later on. Surprisingly, ministerial staffers selected by 
ministers do consider themselves significantly more influential in general – but not towards their 





Table 2: Explaining ex-ante control by elected elites – recruitment 
   Party Leader     MP’s         Ministers 
 
Professional autonomy 1,38 (0,20)     1,10 (0,11)     1,08 (0,10) 
Political influence    
   Party in general 0,87 (0,17)     1,12 (0,13) 1,33 (0,11) * 
   Party leader   1,52 (0,19) *  - - 
   MP’s -     1,00 (0,12) - 
   Minister - -     1,07 (0,09) 
Controls    





0,02 (0,92) *** 
 
0,00 (1,00 *** 
 
Nagelkerke R2 0,39 0,68 0,56 
N 928 571 570 
 Note: Odds Ratio’s (Standard Errors) of Binomial Logistic regressions; ° p ≤ .1, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
 
The link between staffers’ self-perceived influence and permanent monitoring is consistent. Those 
with a higher degree of influence are monitored more closely. This is the case for monitoring by 
party leaders, MP’s and ministers alike (see: Table 3). Moreover, party leaders do not only have 
more contacts with the staffers who influence them, they also monitor autonomous staffers more 
closely (p>0.1). MP’s interact significantly more often with staffers with more influence on the 
party in general and on MP’s themselves. Similar to other elected elites, ministers interact more 
closely with those who influence them. Lastly, it is not surprising that party leaders, MP’s and 
ministers have more frequent contacts with all staffers working within the same party face.  
These findings provide some support for the third hypothesis, which stated that control by elected 
elites is stronger for staffers with higher levels of autonomy and influence. However, the observed 
patterns vary considerably. Firstly, control by elected elites is not stronger towards autonomous 
staffers – except for monitoring by party leaders. Secondly, the expected link between influence 
and control only applies to monitoring. Monitoring shows a consistent link between staffers’ sphere 
of influence and their contacts with elected elites. For recruitment however, this clear-cut effect 
can only be observed for recruitment by party leaders. Although they rarely participate in staff 
recruitment, party leaders are significantly more present during the selection of staffers who will 
influence them later on. In contrast, this is not the case for MP’s and ministers, who participate in 





Table 3: Explaining permanent control by elected elites – monitoring 
   Party Leader     MP’s     Ministers 
 
Professional autonomy    0,04 (0,02) °     0,00 (0,02)   0,03 (0,02) 
Political influence    
   Party in general -0,01 (0,03)    0,11 (0,03) ***  -0,01 (0,03) 
   Party leader       0,21 (0,03) *** - - 
   MP’s -   0,07 (0,03) ** - 
   Minister -  - 0,10 (0,02) *** 
Controls    
   Same party face       1,15 (0,07) *** 1,67 (0,07) *** 1,78 (0,09) *** 
Constant 
 
      1,02 (0,18) *** 
 
2,37 (0,18) *** 
 
1,87 (0,19) *** 
 
Adjusted R2 0,35 0,50 0,54 
N 849 897 826 
Note: Estimates (Standard Errors) of OLS regressions; ° p ≤ .1, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
This paper set out to investigate the democratic legitimacy of political staffers by analysing their 
relationship with elected elites. Although the accountability of political staffers is regularly 
problematized (Barbara S Romzek, 2000; Shaw & Eichbaum, 2018; S. a. Svallfors, 2020), few 
scholars have applied the influential conceptual framework of delegation and accountability (Strom, 
2003) to this peculiar population. By adapting this theoretical perspective to the population of 
political staffers, this innovative paper gave a fresh look into the systemic control of staffers by 
elected elites. The results show that staffers are highly autonomous and have substantial influence 
on the activities of MP’s and government ministers. However, staffers’ autonomy and political 
influence are not problematic because elected elites have ample opportunities to directly oversee 
and steer the actions of staffers. Importantly, all elected elites interact more frequently with 
influential staffers. This last finding is particularly encouraging from a democratic perspective, as 
agency loss among influential staffers could cause the most damage to the democratic chain of 
delegation. Both the high involvement of elected elites in recruitment and monitoring as well as 
the closer relationship to influential staffers show that political staffers do not foster a structural 




The analysis demonstrates that MP’s and government ministers are more involved in controlling 
staffers than party leaders. Not only do MP’s and government ministers participate in the 
recruitment of most of their staff, they interact at least once a week with nearly all of them. These 
findings make sense from the perspective of democratic accountability, as a sizeable group of 
staffers consider themselves influential towards MP’s and government ministers and those working 
within the public face of the party are often more qualified (Moens, 2021). In contrast, only a 
handful of staffers have influence on the party leader. The accountability relationship between party 
leaders and staffers reflects these findings, as only a minority of staffers are recruited by party 
leaders or interact with them on a regular basis. Yet the relation between party leaders and staff 
appears to be more strategic as they consistently focus their limited time and energy on controlling 
those staffers who matter the most. For example, party leaders are significantly more present during 
the recruitment of staffers who will influence them later on. This is not the case for MP’s and 
ministers, who participate in many recruitments but do not devote more attention to influential 
staff.  
The strong connection between staffers’ political influence and their contacts with elected elites 
leads to several potential explanations. While this paper has argued that the political influence of 
certain staffers causes elected elites to monitor them more closely, the causal mechanism could also 
run in the opposite direction. Staffers might perceive themselves more influential exactly because 
they have more frequent contacts with elected elites. Indeed, the frequency of contacts between 
staffers and elected politicians is only a proxy for control as the exact nature of these interactions 
remains undefined. Instead of avenues for unilateral control, such everyday interactions between 
elected and elites and staffers are likely to be reciprocal, resulting in intercursive power dynamics 
where both parties influence each other (Wrong, 2017). Yet even if the frequency of staffers’ 
contacts with politicians increases their political influence, this observation is encouraging from a 
democratic viewpoint. If this would indeed be the case, it would demonstrate that staffers are not 
influential by themselves. Rather than bypassing elected representatives, staffers exert influence 
through their proximity to the elected elites who remain democratic accountable for their actions.  
The structural analysis of staffers’ accountability presented in this paper shows the central 
importance of the interactions between elected elites and their staff. Yet researchers have only 
scratched the surface of this pivotal relationship. In the future, the conceptual framework of 
delegation accountability can be applied to more in-depth analyses of the relationship between 
staffers and elected elites. At this point, it remains unclear whether elected elites actually seize the 




preferences and interests of their elected principals. Although this paper shows that staffers do not 
create accountability deficits on the macro level, this does not rule out disruptions of the 
democratic chain of delegation on the micro level. In this regard, I expect that the individual 
qualities of both staffers and elected elites are of central importance. For example, information-
asymmetry might empower experienced staffers to subtly dominate newly elected representatives 
who lack insider knowledge of the political game (S. Svallfors, 2017b). Moreover, the power balance 
between elected elites could also have a substantial effect on their standing among staffers. As 
privileged observers of everyday politics, staffers can be expected to be acutely aware of the internal 
pecking order among elites. As a consequence, a close advisor to the party leader could actually 
exert more influence than an elected junior backbencher in parliament.  
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N-VA Belgium Conservative 20% 560 Government Eligible members 32% November 2018 - January 2019 
CD&V Belgium Christian-Democratic 12% 521 Government Eligible members 33% December 2018 – March 2019  
PS Belgium Socialist 12% 565 Opposition Eligible members 29% February 2019 - April 2019 
VLD Belgium Liberal 10% 417 Government Eligible members 37% December 2018 - March 2019 
Sp.a Belgium Socialist 9% 192 Opposition Eligible members 34% November 2018 – May 2019 
Groen Belgium Green 5% 91 Opposition Eligible members 45% January 2019 - March 2019 
PVDA-PTB Belgium Radical Left 4% 65 Opposition Delegates to a party 
convention 
38% January 2019 - April 2019 
Ecolo Belgium Green 3% 104 Opposition Eligible members 46% March 2019 – April 2019 
Défi Belgium Liberal 2% 103 Opposition Eligible members 19% March 2019 – April 2019 
VVD Netherlands Liberal 21% 107 Government Eligible members 51% October 2019 -  December 2019 
D66 Netherlands Liberal 12% 93 Government Eligible members 47% September 2019 - November 2019 
PvdA Netherlands Socialist 6% 62 Opposition Eligible members 48% September 2019 - January 2020 
50Plus Netherlands Liberal 3% 27 Opposition Eligible members 22% October 2019 -  November 2019 
SGP Netherlands Conservative 2% 29 Opposition Delegates to a party 
convention 
48% December 2019 




Appendix B. Autonomy by party face 
  N Mean SD t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Central Office staff ° 212 7,76 1,48 1,719 990 0,086 
Parliamentary staff 302 7,87 1,40 0,508 990 0,612 
Ministerial staff ° 480 7,98 1,31 -1,874 990 0,061 
Note: Independent Samples T-test with other party faces as ref. category: ° p ≤ .1, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
 
B.1. Autonomy of central office staff 
 
 
B.2. Autonomy of parliamentary staff 
 









Appendix C. Influence by party face 
C.1. Influence on party in general 
  N Mean SD t df Sig. (2-tailed) 
Central Office staff 212 3,32 1,71 -0,570 304 0,569 
Parliamentary staff *** 302 3,54 1,49 -3,800 992 0,000 
Ministerial staff ***  480  3,06  1,47  4,019  992  0,000  
Note: Independent Samples T-test with other party faces as ref. category: ° p ≤ .1, * p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001 
 
C.1.1. Influence on party in general of central office staff  
 
 
C.1.2. Influence on party in general of parliamentary staff  
 

























C.4. Influence on Minister 
 
 
 
